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1INTRODUCTION
Responsibility and Human Enhancement
Simone Arnaldi
The idea of a special section on ‘human enhancement’
(HE) and responsibility originated from observing how
the public debate on HE, i.e. the intentional effort to
improve individuals’ performance with the help of tech-
nical or biomedical interventions [1], has developed
over the past decades. More specifically, we noted two
trends in the media and academic debate on this subject.
Firstly, there has been an increasing public attention
to and interest in the subject of HE which is no longer
confined to the realms of science fiction and fringe
science. Enhancement has become instead a ‘main-
stream’ subject, with highly visible applications such
as performance enhancing drugs in professional and
amateur sports, the workplace, and education, exoskel-
etons in logistics and the military, or neural implants for
boosting memory and communicating with external
digital devices. Secondly, this rapid growth of mundane
enhancement applications has been met by a remarkable
stability of the arguments and positions represented in
the public debate. Indeed, the discussion on HE has
been, and still is, primarily organized around the two
questions of HE legitimacy and desirability, on the one
hand, and of its technical feasibility, on the other hand.
The advocates of HE answer positively to the question
of legitimacy and desirability, insisting on the benefits
for individuals [2] and, ultimately, for society as a whole
[3]. The critics of HE draw opposite conclusions,
maintaining that HE will lead to greater inequalities
[4], sow divisions [5], and exacerbate existing risks or
create new ones [6]. In a similar fashion, futuristic
visions of enhancements have been criticized as deter-
ministic and misleading [7], and it has been
maintained that options to enhance human performance
on an unprecedented scale is all but assured by current
and future technological trends [8]. Proponents of HE
often fail to recognize that technologies do not develop
in isolation from society, but are socially embedded and
influenced by social, economic, and political conditions
[9]. Critics frequently neglect the fact that enhancement
technologies are already widespread in use and, depend-
ing on how enhancement is defined, have been com-
monplace for centuries [10].
Dissatisfied with this state of affairs, the contributors
to this special section started looking for a way out of the
impasse by drawing upon another increasingly impor-
tant concept in technology and innovation studies and
policy making: the notion of responsibility. While re-
sponsibility is not the only possible answer to the dis-
content with the debate on HE (see, e.g., the attempt to
assess whether enhancement is permissible on the basis
of the ‘nature’ of human activities which would be
altered by HE interventions [11]), this notion has drawn
our attention for its remarkable absence in the HE debate
(see Shelley-Egan et al. [12] for an exception). At least
in Europe, this is particularly surprising given the recent
diffusion of the Responsible Research and Innovation
(RRI) approach. Centred on the idea of aligning tech-
nology and scientific knowledge with societal goals by
way of the mutual responsibilisation of social actors
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2([13–15]), RRI requires researchers and practitioners
alike to reflect and deliberate on the purposes of en-
hancements and their possible contributions concerning
societal challenges. Inspired by the more pragmatic
orientation of RRI, we decided to shift our focus of
attention away from the prior assessment of the ethical
admissibility and the technical possibility of enhance-
ment interventions. Our efforts were instead directed to
explore what the place of ‘responsibility’ is in the HE
debate, and what conditions qualify HE as ‘responsible’.
The contributions to this Special Section, which are the
outcome of the research project BResponsibility and
human enhancement. Concepts, implications and
assessments^ funded by the Independent Social Re-
search Foundation (ISRF), address these aspects on
different levels.
The article by Darian Meacham and Miguel Prado
Casanova investigates the implications of the ‘exten-
sion’ of the human mind into and through hybrid,
human-artifacts cognitive systems. Meacham and Prado
explore a particular form of relation between humans
and cognitive artifacts: interaction-dominance. In
interaction-dominant systems, components cannot be
isolated to determine exactly what their contribution to
the system’s behaviour is. The measured behaviour of
an interaction-dominant system is an emergent property
of the system itself, as it Breflects the coordination of
many componential processes^ [16]. In interaction-
dominant systems, it is therefore Bdifficult, and often
impossible, to assign precise causal roles to particular
components. It is also difficult, and often impossible, to
predict the behaviour of components within interaction-
dominant systems from their behavior in isolation^
([17], 41). Meacham and Prado argue that this condition
negatively affects our possibility to identify agency and
assign responsibility for the consequences of the func-
tioning of interaction-dominant systems, including hy-
brids of humans and cognitive artifacts. Detecting
whether hybrid cognitive systems behave according to
an interaction-dominant logic can have therefore impor-
tant ethical and political implications. The authors in-
troduce ‘pink noise’, a neither random nor predictable,
correlated fluctuation in the system’s behaviour over
time, as a ‘signature’ of interaction-dominant systems
and, therefore, as a Bpotentially useful heuristic, [and] a
possible canary in the proverbial mine^ to detect
interaction-dominant dynamics (on ‘pink noise’ as a
universal feature of the emergent coordination among
system components see, e.g., van Orden, Kloos, and
Wallot [18]). Meacham and Prado remind us that the
Bseamless integration^ of humans and cognitive arti-
facts in hybrid, interaction-dominant systems, which
pink noise signals, may hamper our capacity to morally,
politically, or legally evaluate an action or behaviour, as
the delineation of causal roles and functional compe-
tence, which is central to this assessment, is utterly
difficult or ultimately impossible in these systems. As
a conclusion, the authors suggest that noise can do more
than signaling the characteristics of the system’s behav-
iour, and that, as a disturbance and temporary disruption
of tightly coupled elements of the system, it may turn to
be virtue in the design of increasingly pervasive hybrid
cognitive systems, creating the distance and demarca-
tion between the elements of the system which is nec-
essary to adjudicate and assign responsibility.
The article by Guido Gorgoni focuses on the notion
of responsibility and on the implications which different
definitions of responsibility have for the governance of
HE. Gorgoni notes that the concept of responsibility is
multifaceted and that this notion has been differently
interpreted in theory and dissimilarly applied in practice.
The author summarizes this variety by distinguishing
four responsibility paradigms: Fault, Risk, Precaution,
and Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI). Each
of them has specific features in terms of temporal ori-
entation (prospective/retrospective), agency (active/pas-
sive), guiding principles and means of responsible ac-
tion. Comparing these paradigms, Gorgoni argues that
RRI, Bif taken seriously ,^ has specific characteristics
which makes it uniquely positioned to tackle the chal-
lenges of HE governance. Taking RRI seriously, how-
ever, means to recognize that this governance approach
is much more than engaging social actors in science,
technology and innovation. In Gorgoni’s opinion, ques-
tions about ethical acceptability and social desirability
cannot be separated from human rights which are essen-
tial for what he calls Bthe constitutional identity^ of
RRI. This perspective makes explicit the inherently
normative and political nature of this approach which
it shares with HE, an equally ideologically and norma-
tively committed concept. According to Gorgoni, it is
this similarity that gives RRI its potential, as an explic-
itly normative governance mechanism, to steer the de-
bate on the fundamental, normative assumptions of HE.
Reorganizing the debate on HE around the question of
how it contributes to the fulfillment and implementation
of human rights, this ‘constitutional approach^ to RRI
may also help overcome the dilemmatic choice between
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3discussing Benhancements^ with a Bsmall e^ (those
already existing) or addressing Enhancement with a
Bcapital E^ (speculation about the future, mainly those
envisioned by transhumanist discourse) [12]. From
Gorgoni’s point of view, these dimensions are necessar-
ily complementary, as they share the same fundamental
assumptions about individuals and society.
The article by Toni Pustovrh examines the social
embeddedness of HE (which Gorgoni highlights) by
observing the technological and socio-cultural trends in
the contemporary workplace and their effects on the
motivations for using cognitive enhancement. In
Pustovrh’s view, HE technologies provide new possibil-
ities for adaptation, as individuals can directly restrict the
human body and mind, adjusting them to specific envi-
ronments, niches and demands. In this context, pharma-
cological cognitive enhancement (PCE) has emerged as
a tool available for improving our chances of adaptation
to the ongoing changes affecting the workplace. The
wicked question is what human traits could or should
be modified, as different environments promote distinct
types of capabilities and adaptations, while they simul-
taneously diminish others. Efficiency and performance-
related values, attitudes, expectations, and norms are
surely predominant in the workplace niche, but, as
Pustovrh argues, they could result as ineffective or even
detrimental to individual adaptation in other social con-
texts, such as the family, friendship, and community
where cooperation and solidarity, empathy, and emo-
tional connectedness are socially valuable and desirable.
While helping us work under more stressful and
fatigueing demands, PCE can paradoxically create a
positive loop intensifying performance-related expecta-
tions, thus worsening the already fragile balance be-
tween the different spheres of social life. From this point
of view, Pustovrh concludes, the debate on what respon-
sibility means for HE should not primarily look at opti-
mizing individual adaptation to single socio-cultural
niches, considered in isolation. Precisely the opposite
should be the case, and the logic of balanced integration
between the different societal domains, as well as the
differentiated positions and roles individuals havewithin
and across such domains, should guide decisions and
policies on cognitive enhancement in the workplace and
beyond.
The final article (by the author) presents a public
engagement technique which can be used to anticipate
and explore the interdependencies, alignments, and con-
flicts concerning HE technologies, moral principles and
practices, and responsibility paradigms and arrange-
ments. This technique draws upon the techno-moral
scenario (TMS) approach, which is a scenario method
aimed at stimulating public reflection on the moral
consequences of technological change [19]. This ver-
sion of techno-moral scenarios, called ‘rTMS’ in the
article, examines the outcome of the original technique
(an account of the hypothetical evolution of ethical
controversies following the introduction of new tech-
nologies) through the lenses of Gorgoni’s classification
of responsibility paradigms. In this way, rTMS generate
four, alternative Bresponsibility scenarios^, each of them
based on a specific paradigm. The intent in creating
alternative responsibility scenarios is not to decide be-
forehand what responsibility approaches are relevant or
legitimate to manage the ethical controversies stirred by
HE technologies, but to examine how each responsibil-
ity paradigm differently shapes the institutional arrange-
ments that preside over the assumptions and assignment
of responsibility concerning moral consequences of
technological transformations. Finally, the (in-)compat-
ibilities of the elements in these ‘ideal-typical’ respon-
sibility scenarios are assessed, with the purpose of de-
signing more realistic ‘meta-scenarios’ which can have
a better adherence to socio-technical trajectories that are
more likely to develop.
The articles all propose alternative ways to reflect
on HE, in order to escape the impasse that currently
characterizes the public debate on this subject. To do
so, all the articles took the vantage point of responsi-
bility. Our understanding of this notion is certainly
influenced by the academic literature and policy dis-
cussion about RRI, but it cannot be reduced to it
alone. Retrospectively, responsibility emerges from
these article as the individual and collective disposi-
tion to anticipate and, reflect upon, and deliberate
about the consequences of HE on society, and the
embedding of such a disposition into organizational
configurations and policy alternatives, institutions
and norms, regulations and procedures, technical so-
lutions, and cultural adaptations, so that the moral and
social conflicts related to HE discourse and interven-
tions can be addressed and the consistency between
technological options, normative orientations, and
social formations can be established or maintained.1
1 This formulation is indebted to the definition of Responsible
Research and Innovation (RRI) suggested by Jeroen van den
Hoven ([20], 82).
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4Crucially, the articles refrain from setting substantive
and procedural standards to establish this consistency.
Instead, they focus on delineating the conditions of
allowing anticipation, reflection, and deliberation,
proposing: (1) the design of deliberately Bnoisy^ ex-
tended cognitive systems including humans and arti-
facts, so that agency and responsibility can still be
assigned in the system (Meacham and Prado Casano-
va), (2) the use of human rights as a yardstick to orient
science, technology, and innovation (Gorgoni), (3)
the preference for integration over optimization as a
point of reference for evaluating cognitive enhance-
ment in the workplace and beyond (Pustovrh), and (4)
the development of public engagement techniques
and tools to explore the enmeshed relations between
HE technologies, morality and responsibility
(Arnaldi).
Overall, this collection does not provide a compre-
hensive appraisal of the links between HE and respon-
sibility. Yet, the articles suggest three areas for further
work which can advance a more inclusive understand-
ing of this connection. Conceptually, a more complex
interpretation of responsibility can improve our capacity
to examine, assess, and design governance frameworks
for enhancement technologies. Theoretically, acknowl-
edging that human identity is constructed across differ-
ent social domains can broaden our characterization of
the relevant HE consequences for which we have to
assume responsibility, while recognizing that agency is
transformed by the emergent behaviour of hybrid,
human-artifact systems emphasizes the importance of
design requirements to enable the exercise of responsi-
bility. Methodologically, the involvement of citizens
scrutinizing HE technologies, their moral consequences,
and their social implications, and subsequently deliber-
ating about the forms of their responsible governance,
require the development of public engagement tech-
niques which can explore the co-evolution of these
tightly knotted dimensions.
We dedicate the last words of this introduction to our
colleague Toni Pustovrh who suddenly passed away
during this project. Publishing his last work in this
collection is a way to remember a young and gifted
scholar, and a dear friend.
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